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Abstract—Security analysis is an essential activity in secu-
rity engineering to identify potential system vulnerabilities and
achieve security requirements in the early design phases. Due
to the increasing complexity of modern systems, traditional
approaches, which only consider component failures and simple
cause-and-effect linkages, lack the power to identify insecure
incidents caused by complex interactions among physical systems,
human and social entities. By contrast, a top-down System-
Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) approach
views losses as resulting from interactions, focuses on controlling
system vulnerabilities instead of external threats and is applicable
for complex socio-technical systems. In this paper, we proposed
an extension of STPA-Sec based on data flow structures to
overcome STPA-Secs limitations and achieve security constraints
of information-critical systems systematically. We analyzed a
Bluetooth digital key system of a vehicle by using both the
proposed and the original approach to investigate the relationship
and differences between both approaches as well as their appli-
cability and highlights. To conclude, the proposed approach can
identify more information-related problems with technical details
and be used with other STPA-based approaches to co-design
systems in multi-disciplines under the unified STPA process
framework.
Index Terms—Security Analysis, Complex Interaction,
Information-critical System, Data Flow Structure, STPA-Sec
I. INTRODUCTION
SYSTEM security is an emergent property of the system,which represents a state or condition that is free from
asset loss and the resulting loss consequences. System security
engineering, as a special discipline of system engineering, co-
ordinates and directs various engineering specialties to provide
a fully integrated, system-level perspective of system security
and helps to ensure the application of appropriate security
principles and methodologies during the system life cycle
for asset protection [1]. Violating system security constraints
causes unexpected incidents, like mission failure or leaking
sensitive information, and finally leads to financial or even life
losses. Therefore, security needs to be considered carefully
in system design. Security analysis, referring to the activity
of analyzing systems in security-related aspects to achieve
security requirements in this research, is performed in the early
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security engineering phase and helps to manage system risks
and make decisions.
Traditional security analysis approaches, being designed for
former relatively simple systems, are not effective to ana-
lyze increasingly complex systems. Today’s Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) or Socio-Technical Systems (STS) consist of
not only physical components but also software and even
social elements, in which components in multi-disciplines
interact with each other deeply. For example, an autonomous
vehicle (as a CPS) consists of tens of thousands of physical
components as well as lines of codes. A vehicle Over-The-Air
(OTA) software update system (as an STS) refers to not only
the technical part but also social entities like data providers
and regulations. However, most traditional approaches start
with system decomposition and focus on component failures,
which leads to overlooking impacts of interactions since com-
ponents are analyzed individually. Traditional causality models
attribute accidents to an initial component failure cascading
through a set of other components (like dominos) [2] and can
not address causes of losses with non-linear cause-and-effect
linkages.
To meet the requirements of modern systems, a relatively
new approach for safety engineering called System-Theoretic
Process Analysis (STPA) was proposed [3] and the extension
for security named STPA-Sec was presented later [4]. How-
ever, we recognized some limitations of STPA-Sec when im-
plementing it, especially for data-flow-based systems. There-
fore, this research aims to work out an extended approach
based on the unified STPA process framework for complex
information-critical systems to overcome the identified limita-
tions of STPA-Sec.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we introduce traditional approaches and the STPA series
with research gaps and our contributions. In section III, we
introduce the original STPA-based approaches and propose
the extension in detail. In section IV, we present the analysis
process of a use case by using both original and extended
approaches to demonstrate how to use them and make the
comparison. Finally, we summary this paper in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Traditional Security Analysis Approaches
The purpose of the security analysis in the early design stage
is to achieve security requirements. The Threats Analysis and
Risk Assessment (TARA) is normally the main activity in the
security analysis to identify potential threats and assess threat
risks [5]. The SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) J3061 -
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[5] provides a list of approaches, which contain complete
process frameworks of TARA, like the EVITA approach [6]
and TVRA [7]. Besides, techniques are proposed for only
threat identification or risk assessment and can be used in
the previously mentioned TARA frameworks, including Attack
Tree Analysis (ATA) [8], STRIDE threat models [9], Threat
and Operability Analysis (THROP) [5], Threat Matrix [10]
and BDMP-based (Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes)
Modelling [11] for threat identification, as well as Binary Risk
Analysis (BRA) [12] and NIST SP 800-30 Guide [13] for
risk assessment. Other than methods originally invented for
security, some approaches are evolved from the safety field
by introducing security awareness into the process and support
the co-analysis of both safety and security.
Table I summarizes both original and evolved approaches
with brief introductions. They are all bottom-up approaches
building upon physical or functional decomposition instead of
analyzing the system as a whole initially. They focus more
on the tactic level and may overlook issues at the strategy
level. The tactics are means to accomplish a specific action
and focused on physical threats, while the strategy is regarded
as the art of gaining continuing advantages and is focused
on abstract outcomes [2]. The latter one is useful to broaden
the mind and includes more aspects like organizational and
managerial ones in the analysis.
B. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) Approach and
Extensions
To overcome the limitations of traditional approaches, STPA
was created as a hazard analysis approach based on the
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP),
which views losses as results from interactions among various
system roles that lead to violations of safety constraints and
analyzes issues at the strategy level. STPA provides a powerful
way to deal with complexity by using traceable hierarchical
abstraction and refinement [2].
Other than safety engineering, STPA has also been extended
into other fields with the same system-theoretic thought.
Young and Leveson [4] firstly presented STPA for Security
(STPA-Sec), which shares similar steps with STPA and fo-
cuses on controlling system vulnerabilities instead of avoiding
threats. To perform co-analysis of safety and security under
the STPA framework better, Friedberg et al. [19] proposed
a novel analysis methodology called STPA-SafeSec, which
integrated STPA and STPA-Sec into one concise framework
and overcomes limitations of original approaches (e.g. no
considerations about non-safety security issues) by introducing
security constraints and mapping abstract control structures
to real components. Shapiro [20] proposed STPA for Privacy
(STPA-Priv), which extends STPA into privacy engineering
by introducing privacy concepts and consideration into the
general STPA process steps.
The most significant highlight of STPA-based approaches
is that they shift from focusing on preventing failures and
avoiding threats to enforcing safety constraints and control
system vulnerabilities. Identifying and controlling system vul-
nerabilities rather than brainstorming and reacting to threats
is a more efficient way to achieve system safety and security,
because controlling a vulnerability may be effective to reduce
several threats. Besides, threats are dynamic. Newly emerged
threats can not always be detected in time, but controlling
vulnerabilities can protect the system against even unknown
threats, just like defending a castle by reinforcing walls and not
caring who is the enemy. Another highlight is that the STPA-
based approaches are applicable for socio-technical systems,
which are systems that consider requirements spanning hard-
ware, software, personal, and community aspects [21]. The
analysis scope of the STPA series includes not only physical
system components but also humans, natural or social envi-
ronment and their interactions, which makes the approaches
more suitable for todays complex systems. Furthermore, due
to the numbers of extensions of STPA in various disciplines,
it is easier to perform co-design with similar STPA framework
and the same system model.
C. STPA-Sec Applications and Gaps
The STPA-Sec approach or its extensions have been used
to identify system security constraints in various industries.
Khan, Madnick and Moulton [22] demonstrated the imple-
mentation of STPA-Sec to identify security vulnerabilities
of a use case (Central Utilities Plant Gas Turbine) in in-
dustrial control systems. Carter [23] used STPA-Sec with a
previous information elicitation process to analyze a small
reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. Sidhu [24] applied
an STPA-Sec extension with modified attack tree method to
analyze cybersecurity of autonomous mining systems. Wei and
Madnick [25] analyzed a use case (Over-The-Air software
update) in the automotive industry by using both STPA-
Sec and CHASSIS and compared analysis outcomes, which
showed that STPA-Sec can identify more hazards compared to
CHASSIS, while CHASSIS is more suitable for information
lifecycle analysis.
Nevertheless, researchers also pointed out several limita-
tions of STPA-Sec. Schmittner, Ma and Puschner [26] reported
that the original STPA-Sec lacks guidance for intended causal
scenarios, excludes considerations of the data exchange which
is not directly connected to the process control and cannot
cover more information-security centric properties such as
confidentiality. Torkildson, Li and Johnsen [27] also found that
some essential security issues can be overlooked and recom-
mended to strengthen STPA-Sec by combining it with data-
flow-based threat models. However, Torkildson’s approach
converts the STPA control structure into a data flow diagram
by simply replacing control actions and feedback paths with
data channels. Although such a data flow diagram helps to
identify more data-related threats than using STPA-Sec alone,
this diagram based on the original control loop does not view
the system from the data aspect initially and may also miss
data-related information. Besides, the STPA-Sec approach
regards the security issue as one of the key threats affecting
system safety [25] and only supports the identification of
safety-related security goals [28]. Non-safety-related security
issues like confidentiality may be overlooked.
To sum up, existing STPA-Sec is not effective to identify
non-safety but information-related issues since it does not con-
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF TRADITIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS APPROACHES
Type Approach Brief Introduction
Original Approaches with
complete process
frameworks
E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected
Applications (EVITA)
EVITA approach considers four security objectives (safety, privacy, financial,
operational) and uses attacks trees to identify threats and assess risks [6].
Threat, Vulnerabilities, and implementation
Risks Analysis (TVRA)
TVRA is a process-driven TARA approach to systematically identify
unwanted incidents which need to be avoided [7].
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
OCTAVE is a process-driven TARA method which is best suited for
enterprise information security risk assessments [14].
HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance
Software Security and Safety (HEAVENS)
HEAVENS is a systematic approach of deriving security requirements for
vehicle E/E systems, including processes and tools supporting for TARA [15].
Approaches evolved from
other disciplines and
support co-analysis
A Security-Aware Hazard and Risk
Analysis Method (SAHARA)
SAHARA is a combined approach of the Hazard Analysis and Risk
Assessment (HARA) with the STRIDE model and outlines the impacts of
security issues on safety concepts [16].
Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities and Effects
Analysis (FMVEA)
FMVEA is an approach evolved from the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) to identify vulnerability cause-effect chains for security [17].
Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and
Security (CHASSIS)
CHASSIS is a unified process for safety and security by using UML-based
models (e.g. misuse cases and sequence diagrams) [18].
sider security from the perspective of data flows. Furthermore,
STPA-Sec lacks guidance for identifying security concepts.
D. Contributions
In this paper, we propose a data-flow-based extension of
STPA-Sec (named STPA-DFSec) with elicitation guide words
to overcome STPA-Sec’s limitations. The analysis process of
a vehicle digital key system is presented to demonstrate how
to use STPA-DFSec. We also analyze the same system by
using the original STPA-Sec and compare outcomes though
synthesis and mapping. Finally, we discover the relationship
between both approaches and conclude the highlights and
applicability of them.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Brief Introduction of STPA and STPA-Sec
We briefly introduce the original STPA framework as the
basis of the proposed approach in this section.
STPA starts with defining the purpose of the analysis,
including system-level losses, hazards and constraints. Losses
are about something valuable and unacceptable to the stake-
holders. A hazard is a system state or set of conditions that,
together with a particular set of worst-case environmental
conditions, will lead to a loss. Finally, system constraints can
be derived from identified hazards, which specifies system
conditions or behaviors that need to be satisfied to prevent
hazards and ultimately prevent losses [3].
Then, the control structure needs to be built to describe
relationships and interactions by modelling the system as a
set of control loops (show in Figure 1).
The third step is to identify unsafe control actions, which
will lead to a hazard in a particular context and worst-case
environment [3], based on the previously built structure. Four
ways of being unsafe are provided in STPA as guide words
for the identification (listed in Table V).
Finally, loss scenarios, which describe the causal factors
that can lead to unsafe control actions, will be identified.
Two types of loss scenarios must be considered, which are
scenarios that lead to unsafe control actions and scenarios in
which control actions are improperly executed or not executed
Fig. 1. General Control Loop [3]
[3]. Each identified scenario represents a system failure which
needs to be controlled by designers.
STPA-Sec, as the extension for security considerations,
shares the same basic steps. Vulnerabilities, instead of hazards
are identified in the first step since vulnerabilities lead to
security incidents, which is just like hazards lead to safety
incidents [4]. Similarly, final identified loss scenarios represent
system vulnerabilities which need to be controlled.
B. STPA-DFSec Approach
The proposed STPA-DFSec follows the general STPA
framework but introduces a data-flow-based structure for infor-
mation security considerations. The main steps are described
as follows.
1) Step 1 - Define the purpose of the analysis: Just being
similar with the STPA-Sec, the first step of the analysis is
to identify system-level losses, vulnerabilities and constraints
to figure out what are unacceptable results that need to be
avoided at the system strategy level.
General security attributes like Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability (C.I.A. Triad Model) are guide words for
the vulnerability identification, which classify the security
problems and elicit potential vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, to help to identify losses, STPA-DFSec pro-
vides general guidance for loss identification based on the
study of various safety- and security-related definitions from
standards and technical documents in industries including ISO
26262 [29], EVITA project report [6] and J3061 guideline [5].
All possibilities of losses at a high abstract level are listed in
4Table II. Losses of a particular case are a subset of this general
list and can be described concretely according to practical
situations.
TABLE II
GENERAL LIST OF LOSSES
Label Loss Description
L-1 Loss of life or cause
injury to life
Includes human and animal life
L-2 Loss of physical
property
Represents physical objects belonging
to stakeholders (e.g. devices)
L-3 Loss of non-physical
property
Represents virtual properties belong-
ing to stakeholders (e.g. sensitive in-
formation, reputation)
L-4 Loss of environment Includes the natural or artificial world
2) Step 2 - Model Functional Interaction Structure: Instead
of the control structure, a Functional Interaction Structure
(FIS) based on data flows is created to interpret how the
system works from the perspective of data flows. The basic
element of the FIS is the Function, which works based on its
inputs and algorithms inside and outputs process results. The
processing environment, together with inputs and algorithms,
will affect function behaviors and final outputs. Inputs and
outputs, instead of control actions and feedback, are interac-
tions between components in FIS. Figure 2 shows a general
interaction structure and the function element, in which arrows
represents data flows.
Function
Component BComponent A
Alogrithms
FunctionInputs Outputs
Environment
Function A-1
Function A-2
Function B-1
Function B-2
General FIS
Fig. 2. General FIS and Element ’Function’
3) Step 3 - Identify Insecure Function Behaviors: Based on
the FIS, we can identify Insecure Function Behaviors (IFB)
for the target system by following the basic technique in
STPA. Insecure behaviors are identified with the help of Guide
Words (GW), which are slightly modified to fit the proposed
approach. Table III is the template for identifying IFBs.
TABLE III
TEMPLATE FOR IDENTIFYING IFBS
Function
(F)
GW: Not being
Executed Causes
Vulnerabilities
(NECV)1
GW: being
Executed Causes
Vulnerabilities
(ECV)2
GW:
Timing
Issues (TI)3
S Fn S Fn IFBm14 S Fn IFBm2 S Fn IFBm3
Notes:
1 Represents that the function is not executed successfully.
2 Represents that the function is executed with improper conditions
(e.g. incorrect inputs or algorithms, process with data leakage risks).
3 Represents that the execution exceeds the timing limits.
4 S Fn IFBm is the label of each IFB, in which S represents the
subject of the function.
4) Step 4 - Identify Loss Scenarios: Finally, Loss Scenarios
(LS), as possible causes of IFBs, are identified by using
optimized guide words. Table IV is the template for identifying
LSs with two classes of guide words. The Function itself class
helps to identify scenarios caused by unexpected behaviors
inside the function, while the Execution environment (Env)
class refers to external conditions outside.
TABLE IV
TEMPLATE FOR IDENTIFYING LSS
IFBs GW:
Function
Itself
GW: Env-
Function
Inputs
GW: Env-
Calling
Behaviors
GW: Env-
Computing
Resources
GW:
Env-
Links
S Fn
IFBm
S Fn
IFBm LSp1
S Fn
IFBm LSp2
S Fn
IFBm LSp3
S Fn
IFBm LSp4
S Fn
IFBm LSp5
Each loss scenario represents a system vulnerability which
should be controlled by designers or operators. Detailed sys-
tem constraints can also be derived from loss scenarios by
simply inversing the conditions of loss scenarios or defining
what the system must do in case the incident occurs [3].
System constraints are inputs of further design phases.
C. Summary
Table V summarizes the process steps of both STPA-DFSec
and STPA-Sec with highlights of differences, in which ’+’
donates added features of the STPA-DFSec and ’* represents
modified steps in comparison with the original STPA-Sec.
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Use Case Definition and Assumption
In this section, a Bluetooth digital key system of a vehicle
is introduced as the target system in this research. The system
consists of three main physical components and aims to lock or
unlock vehicle doors by using smartphones. Communication
between different entities are through wireless channels and
protected by cryptographic mechanisms. The system sketch
and sequence diagram of two main services are shown in
Figure 3 to describe how this system works.
In this example case, we assume that the connections
between components have been established via Wi-Fi or
Bluetooth in advance, but the connection is not ensured to be
secure, and the prerequisites in Figure 3 are regarded trusted.
In this research, we only focus on security issues, which means
that the system can work properly without intended external
disturbances and the system development errors and hardware
random failures are out of scope.
B. Analysis by STPA-DFSec
The analysis of the target system by using STPA-DFSec
is presented in this section. First, system-level Losses (L),
Vulnerabilities (V) with linked losses and security attributes
and derived System Constraints (SC) are listed in Table VI.
Second, the functional interaction structure is created in
Figure 4 based on the system data flows. Two functions with
identified IFBs are shown in Table VII as examples. In contrast
5TABLE V
SUMMARY OF STPA-DFSEC AND STPA-SEC STEPS
Basic Four Steps STPA-DFSec Details STPA-Sec Details
Step 1 - Define the pur-
pose of the analysis
Identify system-level losses, vulnerabilities and
constraints, link vulnerabilities with corre-
sponding losses and security attributes+. A
general losses list is provided+.
Identify system-level losses, vulnerabilities
and constraints.
Step 2 - Model the sys-
tem structure
Model the system by functional interaction
structure based on data flows∗.
Model the system by functional control struc-
ture based on control loops.
Step 3 - Identify inse-
cure items
Use modified guide words∗ (not being exe-
cuted, being executed and timing issues) to
identify insecure function behaviors.
Use guide words (not providing, providing,
too early, too late, out of order, stopped too
soon, applied too long) to identify insecure
control actions.
Step 4 - Identify loss
scenarios
Use modified guide words∗ (function itself, ex-
ecution environment(incl. function inputs, call-
ing behaviors, computing resources and links)
to identify loss scenarios.
Use guide words (unsafe controller behavior,
inadequate feedback and information, involv-
ing the control path, related to the controlled
process) to identify loss scenarios.
System Sketch Sequence Diagram
prerequisites
lock or 
unlock doors
user 
register 
or login
User
Smart 
Phone
Cloud 
Server
Door 
Controller
register or login send register or 
login data
pk_u, sk_u and 
pk_s are prepared
pk_s, sk_s and vehicle 
order records are prepared
pk_d, sk_d and 
pk_s are prepared
verify and execute register 
or login based on the 
vehicle order records
m = D(sk_s, c)
register or login result
c = E(pk_u, result)
register or login result
lock/unlock doors
request a session key
s_u = S(cmd+UID_v)
c = E(pk_s, UID_v + s_u)
verify signature,
generate a session key 
for the communication
response the 
session key
c = E(pk_u, k_se+UID_v) c = E(pk_d, k_se+ID_u)
D(sk_d, c)D(sk_u, c)
get the session key
send lock/unlock command
c = E_sym(k_se, cmd)
D_sym(k_se, c)
get and execute 
command
result = D(sk_u, 
E(pk_u, c)
get register result
V(s_u)
m = D(sk_s, c)
k_se = process_2(m)
c = 
E(pk_s, pk_u + ID_u + 
pw_u / ID_u + pw_u)
result = process_1(m)
Notations
pk_u, pk_s, pk_d
sk_u, sk_s, sk_d
E(pk, m)
D(sk, c)
E_sym(k, m)
D_sym(k, c)
S(m)
V(s)
process_1/2(m)
k_se
ID_u
pw_u
UID_v
cmd
m
c
s
Public key of the user, cloud 
server and door controller
Secret key of the user, cloud 
server and door controller
Asymmetric encryption function
Asymmetric decryption function
Symmetric encryption function
Symmetric decryption function
Signature function 
Signature verification function 
Data process function
Session key for the symmetric 
communication
User ID
User password
Unique ID of the vehicle
Lock or unlock command
Plain text
Cipher text
Signature
assign the session key get the 
session key
Door Controller
in the Vehicle
Smartphone
(User)
Cloud 
Server
Fig. 3. Sequence Diagram of the System
to most traditional approaches, this analysis includes partic-
ipants (user and manufacturer) outside the physical system
boundary. Functions in a human operator can also be refined
into more detailed movements like ’decision in the mind’,
’pressing button’ or ’recording password’. Since we focus
on the physical part in this analysis, human movements are
simplified as one human operation function. Note that the
first letter of the IFB labels in Table VII represents system
components including smartphone (P), cloud server (S), door
controller (D), user (U) and manufacturer (M).
Finally, LSs are identified for each IFB. Example LSs with
related guide words in the bracket are listed in Table VIII.
Note that the IFBs and LSs of various subjects are merged to
make the list concise since different system components may
contain the same functions and different insecure behaviors
may have the same causalities. In practice, it is also mean-
ingful to describe each function or LS separately to achieve
security constraints for corresponding engineers, who might
only have access to a part of design information due to security
reasons.
C. Analysis by STPA-Sec
We also analyzed this use case by STPA-Sec. Due to the
same system model, the identified losses, hazards and system
constraints are the same as those in the STPA-DFSec analysis.
Therefore, the work here starts with drawing the system
control structure shown in Figure 5, and then Insecure Control
6TABLE VI
LOSSES, VULNERABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE USE CASE
L-1: Loss of physical property (The vehicle and properties in it)
L-2: Loss of non-physical property (Manufacturers reputation)
V-1: Fail to lock the vehicle without being detected. [L-1/2, Integrity]
V-2: Fail to lock or unlock the vehicle, which can be detected by the
user. [L-2, Availability]
V-3: Leak sensitive information. [L-1/2, Confidentiality]
SC-1: Missions should be completed successfully. [V-1/2]
SC-2: If the mission fails, it must be detected by the user. [V-1]
SC-3: Sensitive information should be protected from leaking. [V-3]
SC-4: If sensitive information is leaked, it should be detected and
reactions need to be taken to minimize losses. [V-3]
Smartphone (P)
Cloud Server (S)
Door Controller (D)
encrypt by pk_s
transmit to cloud decrypt by sk_d
decrypt by 
k_session
encrypt by pk_dencrypt by pk_u
decrypt by sk_sverify user’s signaturetransmit to user
encrypt by pk_s
decrypt by sk_u
calculate user’s 
signature
transmit to cloud
encrypt by 
k_session
plain data process
plain data process
plain data process
transmit to vehicle
transmit to vehicle
I/O signal
Main data flows from the smartphone, cloud server and door controller
Optional data flows from the smartphone
Data flows from operators
Manufacturer (M)
human operation
User (U)
human operation
Fig. 4. Functional Interaction Structure based on Data Flows
TABLE VII
IDENTIFIED INSECURE FUNCTION BEHAVIORS
F GW: NECV GW: ECV GW: TI
P/S/D F2: Data
transmission
P/S/D F2
IFB1
P/S/D F2
IFB2
P/S/D F2
IFB3
U/M F7: human
operation
/ U/M F7 IFB1,
U/M F7 IFB2
/
IFB Description:
P/S/D F2 IFB1: The required data fails to be transmitted. [V-1/2]
P/S/D F2 IFB2: The data is attacked (e.g. eavesdrop, tamper)
during the transmission. [V-1/2/3]
P/S/D F2 IFB3: Function execution violates the timing limits. [V-2]
U/M F7 IFB1: The invalid entity operates with valid data. [V-1/2]
U/M F7 IFB2: The valid entity operates with invalid or
incorrect data. [V-1/2]
Actions (ICA) are identified. ICAs of example Control Actions
(CA) are shown Table IX, in which the first letter of the label
represents the control action’s controller.
Finally, loss scenarios of each ICAs are identified. Some
example LSs are shown in Table X.
D. Outcome Comparison
The functions and control actions are basic elements in the
STPA-DFSec and STPA-Sec respectively. Normally, a control
action includes several functions to provide a service. For
example, the control action D CA1 (Door controller registers
at the server) consists of functions of data process, transmision,
TABLE VIII
LOSS SCENARIOS OF IFBS
IFBs GW: Function
Itself
GW: Environment
P/S/D F2 IFB3 P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS1 P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS2,
P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS3,
P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS4
U/M F7 IFB2 U/M F7 IFB2 LS1 /
LS Description:
P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS1: The function algorithm is modified to
cause corresponding insecure function behaviors.
P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS2: The input data size is modified, which
requires more time to compute. (Env -Function Inputs)
P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS3: Computing resource is occupied to cause
violation of execution timing limitations. (Env -Computing Resources)
P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS4: Transmission is slowed down by additional
mechanisms on links (e.g. additional switches). (Env -Links)
U/M F7 IFB2 LS1: The valid entity is fooled intendedly to use
invalid or incorrect data.
Smartphone (P) Door Controller (D)
output 
(un)lock signal(un)lock doors
Cloud Server (S)
register or login, 
request a 
session key
register or login 
result, 
responsed 
session key
assign a 
session key
User (U)
register, login,
(un)lock doors
register or login 
result
Manufacturer (M)
register register result
register
register 
result control actions
feedback
outputs
execution 
feedback
key assignment 
feedback
Fig. 5. Control Structure of the System
TABLE IX
IDENTIFIED INSECURE CONTROL ACTIONS
CA GW: Not
Providing
GW:
Providing
GW: Timing
Issues1
D CA1: Register D CA1 ICA1 D CA1 ICA2 D CA1 ICA3
U CA2: Lock or
unlock doors
/ U CA2 ICA1 /
ICA Description:
D CA1 ICA1: The door controller fails to register at the server. [V-2]
D CA1 ICA2: The door controller registers with data leakage risks.
(e.g. UID, public key leakage). [V-3]
D CA1 ICA3: The action violates the timing limits. [V-1]
U CA2 ICA1: The user is fooled to send wrong commands. [V-1/2]
Notes:
1: Two GWs about timing in STPA-Sec are merged as timing issues.
encryption and decryption. Therefore, the relationship between
these two elements is that a sequence of the execution of
functions forms a control action.
To find out how different approaches work on the same use
case, we mapped the analysis outcomes in both analyses. For
example, D CA1 ICA3 LS1 and D CA1 ICA3 LS3 in the
STPA-Sec analysis can be mapped to P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS1.
U CA2 ICA1 LS1 and U CA2 ICA1 LS2 can be mapped
to U F7 IFB2 LS1. After performing the mapping for all
analysis outcomes, we found that each loss scenario in the
STPA-Sec analysis can be mapped to a corresponding one
in the STPA-DFSec analysis from the perspective of data
7TABLE X
LOSS SCENARIOS OF ICAS
ICAs GW:
Controller
GW:
Controller
Path
GW:
Controlled
Process
GW:
Feedback
Path
D CA1
ICA3
D CA1
ICA3 LS1
D CA1
ICA3 LS2
D CA1
ICA3 LS3
U CA2
ICA1
/ / U CA2
ICA1 LS1
U CA2
ICA1 LS2
LS Description:
D CA1 ICA3 LS1: The algorithm at the controller is tampered,
which requires more calculating time.
D CA1 ICA3 LS2: The link is modified to slow down the
data transmission.
D CA1 ICA3 LS3: The algorithm at the controlled process is
tampered, which requires more calculating time.
U CA2 ICA1 LS1: The user interface of the smartphone is
modified to guide the user to send wrong commands.
U CA2 ICA1 LS2: The vehicle state is presented wrongly,
which leads to the users wrong behaviors.
process, which means that the proposed approach can find all
possibilities identified by the original approach. Furthermore,
more loss scenarios can be identified in the STPA-DFSec
analysis. For example, the scenario ’Computing resource is
occupied to cause violation of execution timing limitations.’
(P/S/D F2 IFB3 LS3 in Table VIII) cannot be identified by
the STPA-Sec. Therefore, more technical details related to the
data process can be revealed by the data-flow-based analysis.
Another finding is that an STPA-DFSec loss scenario can
be mapped to several STPA-Sec ones because a function is
always called by various control actions for different applica-
tions. This explains why STPA-Sec can reveal more detailed
information from the perspective of applications.
E. Discussion
After the comparison, we concluded the differences and
highlights of both approaches. The STPA-DFSec focuses on
information flows and discusses possible vulnerabilities along
the whole data flow paths, which helps to identify more
detailed loss scenarios from the perspective of information
flows. By contrast, since control actions in STPA-Sec are
derived from system functionalities, STPA-Sec can reveal
more insecure details linked to concrete application scenarios.
STPA-DFSec addresses where (in which function) a loss
scenario occurs, while STPA-Sec addresses when (in which
application scenario) a loss scenario occurs.
Since both approaches have different advantages, how to
choose an approach depends on particular cases. Two princi-
ples can be used to help the decision. The first one is according
to system purposes. If the data is the core asset in a system,
STPA-DFSec is suitable for analysis insecure issues with more
considerations on the information. If providing proper and
secure services is the main object of a system, STPA-Sec is
applicable to identify insecure issues linking with application
scenarios. The second principle is to consider who uses it.
STPA-DFSec is suitable for designers who are responsible for
technical structure and design, while STPA-Sec is more useful
for ones who design the system functionalities and make more
high-level decisions.
Actually, system security engineering is not able to ensure
absolute security but provides a sufficient base of evidence
that supports claims that the expected level of trustworthiness
has been achieved [1]. The analysis in security engineering
is also not able to be proven complete, and the analysis
results normally depend on the analyst’s knowledge and design
emphasis. However, a proper systematic approach can help the
analyst to be more confident in the analysis completeness [2].
Proper guide words help to reduce the dependency on personal
experience and subjective thinking and lead to objective and
valid results with less effort. Although the case study in this
paper represents the authors’ understanding of the system, the
analysis results are comparable and meaningful because both
analyses were performed by the same group of analysts.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a data-flow-based approach
for security analysis of information-critical systems based on
the STPA framework to overcome STPA-Sec’s limitations.
The analyses of a vehicle digital key system by using both
the STPA-DFSec and STPA-Sec have been presented and
compared to show how to use the approaches and how well
both approaches work on the same use case.
We have found that the proposed STPA-DFSec focuses
on data flows and can reveal more details in information
security aspects, which are hard to be addressed in the STPA-
Sec analysis, while the STPA-Sec analyzes systems from the
perspective of applications and more concerns safety-related
security issues. Besides, since STPA-based approaches were
created for high-level decisions rather than tactical details [2],
the proposed STPA-DFSec extends considerations into lower
levels with technical details. Furthermore, as an extension of
the STPA series, the proposed approach, together with other
STPA-based approaches, can be used to co-design complex
systems in multi-disciplines from high to low system levels
under the unified STPA framework. Social aspects and human
factors can be included in the analysis, which are excluded in
traditional analysis approaches.
In the future, we will study more industry cases and conduct
experiments with different groups of analysts to validate and
refine the proposed approach in practices since we performed
both analyses in this paper, which might influence the validity
of analysis outcomes. Furthermore, we will formalize the
analysis process and design tools to achieve analysis results
automatically for higher working efficiency.
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